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of recycling newspaper paper required the exemption
for newspapers. Nevertheless, because the Depart-
ment looked at the contents of a publication in deter-
mining whether it was considered a newspaper for
taxation purposes, the statute was not narrowly
drawn for this interest either. 3 Stressing that the
means must be narrowly tailored to achieve the end
goal of recycling, the court implied in dicta that recy-
cling would be a valid interest only if the Department
Of Revenue looked solely at the type of paper used
in determining whether a publication would be
taxed. 4 The Florida Supreme Court held that the tax
could not pass muster under strict scrutiny."5
In determining the appropriate remedy for this
violation, the court applied state law. 6 The Florida
statute made it clear that between the imposition of a
tax or the granting of an exemption, the imposition of
a tax should prevail. Accordingly the Florida Supreme
Court reversed the trial court's invalidation of the tax
and ordered it to strike the newspaper exemption so
that the Florida Department of Revenue would now
impose the tax on magazines and newspapers equal-
ly.
CONCLUSION
The Florida Supreme Court found the Florida tax
scheme differentiated between newspapers and mag-
azines based on their content and therefore applied
strict scrutiny. Ultimately the court found the taxation
scheme violated the First Amendment because it was
not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling govern-
ment interest. Although the state had a compelling
interest in both literacy and recycling, the statute was
not narrowly drawn toward either end.
Sarah Joyce
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King v. Innovation Books,
976 F2d 824 (2d Cir. 1992).
INTRODUCTION
Stephen King ("King") sought to enjoin the pro-
ducer and distributer of the motion picture "THE
LAWNMOWER MAN" from using a possessory credit
or a "based upon" credit which associated King's
name with the motion picture. King claimed that the
use of his name in conjunction with the motion pic-
ture falsely designated him as the originator of the
movie in violation of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that
King was entitled to a preliminary injunction against
the use of King's name "on or in connection with" the
motion picture; however, King was not entitled to an
injunction against the use of a "based upon" credit.'
FACTS
King is a famous horror writer. The defendants
are Allied, a British motion picture production compa-
ny and New Line, an American motion picture distrib-
ution company.
In 1970, King wrote a short story called "The
Lawnmower Man" (the "Short Story"). King assigned
the motion picture and television rights for the Short
Story to Great Fantastic Picture Corporation, which
later transferred its rights to Allied. After the screen-
play for the feature-length motion picture was com-
pleted, Allied licensed the distribution rights to the
motion picture in North America to New Line. King
was not involved in the creation of the screenplay or
in the production of the motion picture. In February
1991, the defendants began to market the motion pic-
ture as "Stephen King's THE LAWNMOWER MAN,"
and as "based upon" a short story by King.
After King first learned about the motion picture
in October 1991, King ordered his attorney to inform
the defendants that he objected to the use of both the
possessory credit and "based upon" credit and that he
wished to see a copy of the film. On March 3, 1992,
just days before the release of the motion picture in
theaters, the defendants allowed King to view the
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motion picture. In the meantime, the defendants were
still advertising "THE LAWNMOWER MAN" with both
possessory and "based upon" credits.
In May, 1992, King filed suit against the defen-
dants in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York, seeking damages and
an injunction for the use of the possessory and "based
upon" credits. King claimed that the credits violated
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act because the credits
were false and misleading. 2 The district court granted
a preliminary injunction against the defendants' use of
the credits. The injunction prohibited the defendants
from using King's name "on or in connection with"
the motion picture.' The defendants appealed.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
King argued that he was entitled tb a preliminary
injunction against the use of possessory and "based
upon" credits since he was likely to succeed on the
merits of his claim that the possessory and "based
upon" credits were false and misleading in violation
of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit analyzed the
possessory credit separately from the "based upon"
credit.
First, the Court of Appeals held that the possesso-
ry credit was false and therefore the district court was
correct to enjoin its use. The general rule is that a
false or misleading reference to the origin of a work
is a violation of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.' A
possessory credit is usually given to the director, pro-
ducer or writer of a motion picture. At a minimum, a
possessory credit acknowledges a person who had
some involvement in or gave approval to a motion
picture or screenplay., The words "Stephen King's
THE LAWNMOWER MAN" implies that King had
some involvement in the screenplay or motion pic-
ture. The court reasoned that King was neither
involved in "THE LAWNMOWER MAN" screenplay or
motion picture nor did King give his approval to the
motion picture. Furthermore, the court stated, when
attribution is false on its face, as it is here, no evi-
dence of public confusion is required in order to
grant an injunction.6 Thus, the court held, the posses-
sory credit is false and an injunction against its use
was proper.
Second, the Court of Appeals held that since King
was not likely to succeed on the merits in his claim
against the "based upon" credit, the district court was
incorrect to enjoin use of the "based upon" credit.
Unlike the possessory credit, the "based upon" credit
is proper when a work is derivative of an underlying
work. Therefore, the "based upon" credit is given
more "leeway" than the possessory credit.7
The district court applied the incorrect standard in
its determination of the "based upon" credit. The dis-
trict court compared the motion picture as a whole to
how much protected material from the Short Story
appeared in the motion picture. Focusing on the pro-
portion of the motion picture attributable to the Short
Story, the district court held that the "based upon"
credit was misleading. However, the proper emphasis
should have been on the "proportion, in quantitative
and qualitative terms," of the Short Story appearing in
the motion picture.8 Generally, absent countervailing
facts and circumstances, a "based upon" credit is not
misleading when a motion picture takes material
respects, both quantitatively and qualitatively, from a
literary work.9
In applying this standard, the court found that the
core of the Short Story was used in the motion pic-
ture. Although there were facets of the Short Story
which did not appear in the motion picture and, like-
wise, elements of the motion picture which were
independent of the Short Story, the court believed
that the motion picture resembled in "sufficiently
material respects" the Short Story's qualitative and
quantitative elements.
Moreover, King did not offer any countervailing
facts or circumstances to prove that the "based upon"
credit was misleading. There was no evidence that
the "based upon" credit caused any industry or con-
sumer confusion. Thus, since the "based upon" credit
was not misleading and, therefore, did not violate
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, an injunction against
its use was not proper.
CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed the injunction against the use of King's name
in a possessory credit in conjunction with the motion
picture "THE LAWNMOWER MAN". However, the
prohibition against the use of King's name in a "based
upon" credit was reversed since a significant portion,
both qualitative and quantitative, of King's Short Story
appeared in the motion picture. Thus, a "based upon
credit" was not misleading or confusing to the public.
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